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It has been shown that there is a significant relationship between children’s mentalizing
skills and creation of an imaginary companion (IC). Theorists have proposed that
interaction with an IC may improve mentalizing skills, but it is also possible that children’s
mentalizing skills affect their creation of an IC. In this longitudinal study, we examined
whether goal attribution in infants younger than 1 years old (Time 1) predicted their
creation of ICs at 48 months old (Time 2). At Time 1, infants’ goal attribution was
measured in an action prediction experiment, where infants anticipated three types
of action goals: (1) another person’s goal-directed action (GH condition); (2) another
person’s non-goal-directed (BH condition); and (3) a mechanical claw’s goal-directed
action (MC condition). At Time 2, parents completed questionnaires assessing whether
their children had ICs. The path analyses using Bayesian estimation revealed that infants’
anticipation in theMC condition, but not in the GH and BH conditions, predicted their later
IC status. These results indicate that infants’ goal attributions to non-human agents may
be a strong predictor of their later IC creation. Early mentalizing skills toward non-human
objects may provide children with a basis for their engagement in imaginative play.
Keywords: imaginary companion, mentalizing, goal-directed actions, longitudinal study, Bayesian estimation
INTRODUCTION
Young children enjoy playing with Imaginary Companion (IC) (Bouldin and Pratt, 1999; Taylor,
1999; Gleason et al., 2000; Taylor et al., 2004, 2013; Gleason, 2004a; Moriguchi and Shinohara,
2012; Moriguchi et al., 2015). IC is originally defined as “an invisible character, named and referred
to in conversation with other persons or played with directly for a period of time, at least several
months, having an air of reality for the child but no apparent objective basis” (Svendsen, 1934).
However, recently, personified objects, such as dolls and puppets, are also defined as IC (Taylor,
1999). The present study examined whether this type of children’s play was related to an early form
of mentalizing, the ability to read the mental states, such as desire, intention, and belief, of other
agents (Morton and Frith, 1995; Frith and Frith, 2003).
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It has been shown that there is a significant relationship
between IC play and mentalizing in young children (Taylor and
Carlson, 1997; Roby and Kidd, 2008; Giménez-Dasí et al., 2014),
although there is still controversial discussion about the issue
(Fernyhough et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2011, 2014). Taylor and
Carlson (1997) classified children into high and low fantasy
orientation groups based on children’s play, such as IC play,
and examined whether there were differences in performance
on mentalizing tasks (e.g., false belief tasks) between groups.
The results revealed that children with high fantasy orientation
performed better on mentalizing tasks than those with low
fantasy orientation.
Moreover, children with IC are more likely than those without
IC to attribute psychological properties to non-human agents.
Moriguchi and Shinohara (2012) reported that children with
and without IC differed in their attribution of psychological
properties (e.g., think) to an invisible agent (but see also,
Moriguchi et al., 2015). Wigger et al. (2012) showed that children
with IC attributed psychological properties to their IC as well as
God. In addition, Tahiroglu (2012) reported that children with IC
have a stronger tendency to choose anthropomorphic statements
(i.e., attributing psychological properties to non-human objects)
compared to those without IC.
Previous research suggests that children with IC have
a stronger tendency to attribute psychological properties to
other people and non-human objects than those without IC.
Theoretically, the dominant view is that IC play improves
children’s capacity to mentalize. Harris (2000) argued that role
play, such as IC play, may improve children’s simulation skills,
and such skills may facilitate mentalizing. In IC play, children
have to simulate how an imaginary agent thinks and feels in a
given situation. The simulation process can extend tomentalizing
about another person (Roby and Kidd, 2008; Giménez-Dasí
et al., 2014) and other non-human objects. The simulation view
is supported by recent longitudinal evidence that children’s IC
status at 3 years of age predicts better performance on false belief
tasks (Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014).
However, an alternative, not mutually exclusive, view is that
the early mentalizing skills may be related to the creation of an
IC (Dore et al., 2015). The view is inspired by evidence that
the frequency of parental mental-state language during infancy
predicts children’s IC status in their preschool years (Motoshima
et al., 2014). According to this view, children who are better at
mentalizing may create ICs (Moriguchi and Shinohara, 2012).
Children with better mentalizing skills aremore likely to attribute
psychological properties to other people as well as non-human
objects, such as a puppet or a doll (Jipson and Gelman, 2007).
Such children can enjoy playing with personified objects or
inventing an invisible agent, which may be related to the creation
an IC. Indeed, Barrett (2012) argued that mentalizing skills
during infancy may be the basis for representing invisible agents.
According to this theory, after infants develop the capacity to
mentalize an agent, they may use such skills to identify and
represent non-human objects as agents. In other words, infants
may have a strong sensitivity to the presence of possible agents
around them. Barrett suggests that the infants’ sensitivity to non-
human objects may be the basis for representing and interacting
with an invisible agent, such as gods. Thus, the same logic could
be applied to representing an IC.
Recent research has shown that infants under 1 year of age
are equipped with the precursors of mentalizing, such as goal
attribution, and they tend to attribute psychological properties
to other people as well as non-human objects (Woodward, 1998;
Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Biro and
Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Yamaguchi et al., 2009; Kanakogi
and Itakura, 2011). Importantly, there are substantial individual
differences in infants’ goal attribution, and some infants are better
than others (Sommerville et al., 2005; Aschersleben et al., 2008;
Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011). Moreover, the early advantage of
goal attribution during infancy predicts better performance in
mentalizing tasks at preschool age (e.g., Aschersleben et al., 2008;
Yamaguchi et al., 2009).
Given the evidence, the present study focused on infants’ goal
attribution as a precursor of mentalizing skills, and examined
whether infants’ goal attributions about other people and non-
human objects predicted their IC status at preschool age. In
this longitudinal study, children participated in the study when
they were younger than 1 years old (Time 1) and when they
were 48 months old (Time 2). We chose this age range because
a previous study showed that parental mental-state language
during infancy predicted children’s IC status at preschool age
(Motoshima et al., 2014). At Time 1, we used an action prediction
task as an index of goal attribution (Kanakogi and Itakura, 2011).
In this task, infants were shown videos in which three types of
actions were presented: (1) a human’s grasping hand was used as
the goal-directed action (GH condition); (2) the back of a hand
was used as non-goal-directed action (BH condition); and (3)
a mechanical claw was used as non-human goal-directed action
(MC condition). Using an eye-tracking technique, we measured
the time of gaze arrival at the goal relative to the arrival of the
observed agents’ actions as an index of goal attribution (Falck-
Ytter et al., 2006). At 48 months, we examined whether children
had an IC based on parental reports.
In theMC condition, we assessed infants’ tendency to attribute
goal-directedness to non-human objects. Goal attribution to a
mechanical claw can be used as an index of goal attribution
to non-human, inanimate objects (Hofer et al., 2005). IC play
includes children’s tendency to attribute psychological properties,
such as emotion, goal, and intention, to non-human agents,
such as puppet or dolls (i.e., personified object; Taylor, 1999;
Harris, 2000). Given the previous evidence, we hypothesized
that performance in this condition would be strongly related
to children’s IC status at Time 2. In addition, we predicted
that performance in the GH condition would be moderately
related to IC status at Time 2 because this condition assesses
the tendency to attribute goal-directedness to another person.
In other words, goal attribution in the MC condition during
infancy may be directly related to psychological attribution to
non-human objects such as puppets, and the tendency may
lead to the creation of an IC. However, goal attribution in
the GH condition may be indirectly related to psychological
attributions to the objects. Given that there might be some
overlaps between psychological attributions toward humans and
non-humans (Moriguchi and Shinohara, 2012; Wigger et al.,
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2012), we predicted that goal attributions in the GH condition
therefore may be moderately correlated with the creation of an
IC. Finally, performance in the BH condition should not predict
children’s IC status.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were recruited from a registry of families maintained
in the Child Development Lab at Kyoto University. Informed
consent was obtained from the children’s parents prior to their
involvement in the study. The study was conducted in accordance
with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki and the study
design was approved by the local ethics committee.
Nineteen children (6 boys and 13 girls) participated in this
longitudinal study. The age at the first test (Time 1) varied across
participants, and the mean age was 8.5 ± 2.3 months (mean ±
standard deviation [SD]; age range = 4.0–10.5 months; 12 girls).
All children were 48.0 months at the second test (Time 2). All
participants were frommiddle-class backgrounds. The data from
Time 1 were partly reported in Kanakogi and Itakura (2011).
Research Design
Children and their parents participated in the study at Time 1 and
Time 2. At Time 1, the study took place in an experiment room at
Kyoto University. At Time 2, a questionnaire including questions
about ICs was mailed to parents.
Action Prediction Experiment
The action prediction experiment was the same as in Kanakogi
and Itakura (2011), and therefore we described the procedure
briefly. A Tobii T60 Eye Tracker (Tobii Technology) was used to
record participants’ eye movements. Children were shown three
types of videos (subtending 19.9◦ × 16.1◦ of visual angle) in
which agents (human or mechanical claw) reached toward one
of two toys at the upper part of the screen from the infant’s
perspective. There were three types of videos: a grasping hand in
the GH condition, the back of the hand in the BH condition, and
a mechanical claw in the MC condition (Figure 1). Each video
consisted of five components. The hand (or claw) was out of the
frame for the first 3 s of the video (Figure 1A). The hand (or claw)
then appeared from the bottom of the frame and moved upward
(2 s), stopped (1 s) (Figure 1B), moved toward one of the two toys
(2 s), and stopped at the target toy (1 s) (Figure 1C). The hand
or claw in the GH and MC conditions grasped the target toy,
whereas in the BH condition the back of the hand was placed on
the target toy. The videos were 9 s in duration, and the duration
of each component was controlled across videos. There were six
trials in each of the three conditions.
All gaze data were analyzed using Tobii’s standard statistics
package (Tobii Technology). We defined three areas of interest
(AOI) (Figure 2): one covering the target object (goal AOI), one
covering the position where agents stopped before starting to
move toward the target object (agent AOI), and one covering the
agent’s movement trajectory (trajectory AOI).
The timing of gaze shifts to the goal AOI was compared to the
arrival of the agent’s action. The arrival of the agent’s action was
FIGURE 1 | Selected frames from the video stimuli in each condition.
The conditions are grasping hand (GH, left panels), back of hand (BH, middle
panels), and mechanical claw (MC, right panels). (A) The agents are out of the
frame. (B) The agents appear from the bottom of the frame, move upward,
and then stop. (C) The agents move toward one of two toys, stop at the target
toy, and then make contact by grasping (GH, MC) or touching with the back of
the hand (BH). We acknowledge Nature Publishing Group for reuse of figures
from Kanakogi and Itakura (2011).
FIGURE 2 | Analytical examples of stimulus videos and grasping ability.
Example grasping hand condition video. The black rectangles and hexagon
represent AOIs within the scene. The upper AOI is the “goal AOI” and
encompasses the target object. The lower AOI is the “agent AOI” and
encompasses the position where the agent stopped before beginning to move
to the target object. The middle AOI is the “trajectory AOI” and encompasses
the agent’s movement trajectory. We acknowledge Nature Publishing Group
for reuse of figures from Kanakogi and Itakura (2011).
defined as the time when half of the hand (in the GH and BH
conditions) or claw (in the MC condition) was located within the
goal AOI. If the participant’s gaze arrived at the goal AOI before
the agent, the trial was regarded as predictive (positive score). In
contrast, if the participant’s gaze arrived at the goal AOI after
the agent arrived at the goal AOI, the trial was not regarded as
predictive (negative score).
Data were included in the analyses if the participants’
responses met the following criteria for at least two trials in each
condition. First, participants had to fixate on both the objects
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and the agent before the agents had started to move. Second,
participants had to fixate on the agent AOI for 200ms after the
agent had moved or fixate on the agent in the trajectory AOI
for 200–600ms while the agent was moving to the target object.
Third, they had to fixate on the goal AOI before the video ended.
We did not include the first trial of each condition in the analysis
because the gaze shift of the first trial is not predictive.
Imaginary Companions
Parents completed the questionnaire about ICs when the children
were 48months old. A previous study validated the questionnaire
in an interview with parents (Motoshima et al., 2014). Moreover,
a previous study has shown that parental reports on IC status
perfectly matched children’s reports (Gleason, 2004b). An IC was
defined as a vivid imaginary character that does not actually exist
but is treated as real by the child and who the child interacts with
during daily activities. Episode examples of both personified-
object ICs and invisible ICs were given so that parents understood
what was meant by ICs. Then, parents were asked if their child
had ICs similar to the examples. If so, parents answered questions
about the following: number of ICs; age of the child when the
IC appeared and, if relevant, disappeared; age, gender, name,
appearance, and personality of the IC; scenes and activities in
which the IC was engaged; and child’s attitude toward the IC.
Children were regarded as having ICs if parents answered that
(1) their child has ICs, (2) the ICs were the same over time, (3)
the ICs have names, (4) children and ICs interacted for more than
one month.
RESULTS
Descriptive Results
Mean action prediction scores (SD) in the action prediction
experiment at Time 1 were 67.6 (318.6) in the GH
condition, −106.6 (362.3) in the BH condition, and −291.7
(289.7) in the MC condition. The SDs were relatively large
because participant age varied at Time 1. Statistical analyses are
reported below. Next, we report the descriptive IC results. First,
we examined the characteristics of each IC group. Four children
had both invisible friends and personified objects, 11 children
had personified objects, and 4 children did not have any ICs. The
number of children with ICs was relatively high compared to
previous studies, but the fact that these Japanese children were
more likely to have personified objects than invisible friends
is consistent with previous studies (Moriguchi and Shinohara,
2012; see also Discussion). Example ICs are presented in Table 1.
Three invisible friends were people and one invisible friend
was unclear to the parent. In terms of personified objects, all
children had personified animal puppets (e.g., bear, monkey, and
turtle). Most previous studies did not discriminate children with
invisible friend from those with personified objects. However,
children show different behaviors to different types of IC. Indeed,
research showed that the relationship with invisible friends
was more egalitarian whereas the relationship with personified
objects was more hierarchical (Gleason et al., 2000). Moreover,
children with invisible friends showed better knowledge about
another person’s social relationship than those with personified
TABLE 1 | Example imaginary companions.
Name Description
Hana-chan An invisible girl who is cute and has long hair
Panda-chan A personified panda who is always hungry and likes walking
Me-Me A personified lamb who is shy
Saru-san A personified monkey who is like a sibling
object or those without ICs (Gleason, 2002). Thus, there might
be qualitative differences between two types of IC. We decided
that children scored 1 point for each type of IC (i.e., children who
had an invisible friend and personified object scored 2 points).
The total IC scores (TO) were used in subsequent analyses. There
were more girls in the IC compared to boys, but this difference
was not significant (Fisher’s exact tests, p > 0.10). Because there
were no significant differences between groups in terms of sex,
sex differences were not analyzed further.
The relationship between Action Prediction
and Imaginary Companions
Path Analysis with Bayesian Estimation
Our goal was to examine the relationships between action
prediction scores in the GH, BH, andMC conditions and total IC
scores (TO). However, action prediction scores in each condition
were moderately correlated with age (in months). Therefore, we
performed three path analyses (one for each condition) to control
for age effects (Figure 3).
Because sample size was small (N = 19), we analyzed
data using Bayesian estimation, more specifically, using the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method (Schoot et al.,
2014). We set prior distributions of all parameters as non-
informative and used Gibbs sampler as the MCMC algorithm,
which are defaults (Muthén and Muthén, 2012). In MCMC, we
ran four independent chains with lengths of 100,000, discarded
the first half of each chain as burn-in, and used every 50th
iteration of the last half to estimate posterior distributions. We
checked convergence of each chain using trace plots and auto-
correlations. Then, we checked model fits by posterior predictive
check and calculated posterior means as point estimates. We
also calculated 95% highest density intervals as 95% credibility
intervals. We used Mplus ver. 6 for the analyses. In the analysis,
we assumed that TO was an ordinal scale.
Convergence and Model Fits
First, we checked convergence of each chain using trace
plots and auto-correlations. Trace plots and auto-correlations
suggested that all chains converged and that estimated posterior
distributions were good approximations of true posterior
distributions. Examples are shown in Figures 4, 5 which depict
trace plots of all iterations and auto-correlations of every 50th
iteration, respectively. Next, we checked model fit of the three
models using posterior predictive p-values. Values around 0.5
indicate that the model fits well. Posterior predictive p-values of
the three models were 0.550 (GH path analysis), 0.547 (BH path
analysis), and 0.522 (MC path analysis). Thus, all models fit the
data well.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 221
Moriguchi et al. Goal Attribution and Imaginary Companion
FIGURE 3 | Path analysis models.
Point Estimates and Credibility Interval
After confirming convergence and model fits, we calculated
posterior means and 95% credibility intervals. The results
are shown in Table 2. In Table 2, (β_(Y.X)) ∧denotes path
coefficients from X to Y, σ_Y∧2 represents residual variance of Y,
µ_Y denotes the intercept of Y, and τ_n represents nth thresholds
of TO. In Table 2, path coefficients, (β_(TO.GH))∧ and
(β_(TO.BH))∧, are near zero and their 95% credibility intervals
include zero. Therefore, it is likely that GH and BH do not
strongly predict TO after controlling for age effects. In contrast,
we found a path coefficient (β_(TO.MC))∧ of 0.571 and the 95%
credibility interval did not include zero. Thus, we confirmed
that MC strongly predicted TO even when age effects were
controlled.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined whether infants’ ability to
predict another person’s goal-directed action (GH condition),
another person’s non-goal-directed action (BH condition), and
a mechanical claw’s goal-directed action (MC condition) affected
their later IC status. The results revealed that goal attributions
in the MC condition, but not GH and BH conditions, predicted
children’s IC status. The results partially support our hypothesis.
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence to show that
early mentalizing skills during infancy may affect children’s IC
status. Previous studies have shown a significant relationship
between children’s IC status and mentalizing, such as false belief
understanding (Taylor and Carlson, 1997; Taylor, 1999; Roby and
Kidd, 2008). Although with the exception of a few studies (Lillard
and Kavanaugh, 2014) these results are correlational, researchers
have assumed that children’s interaction with IC may affect
the development of mentalizing skills (Harris, 2000; Giménez-
Dasí et al., 2014). However, theoretically, it is also possible
that children’s capacity to mentalize leads to the creations of
ICs. Nevertheless, few studies have examined whether early
mentalizing skills predict children’s IC status.
The present study examined whether infants’ mentalzing skills
in the GH, BH, andMC conditions predicted their later IC status.
The results showed that goal attribution in the MC condition was
a predictor of children’s IC status. Thus, infants who tended to
attribute psychological properties (i.e., goal directedness) to non-
human objects may be more likely to create an IC than those who
did not. The results may be due to that infants with better goal
attribution are more likely to attribute psychological properties
to non-human objects, such as a puppet or a doll, and the
children can enjoy playing with personified objects or inventing
an invisible agent, which may be related to the creation an IC.
However, infants’ goal attribution in the GH and BH conditions
did not predict their later IC status. Because the stimuli in the
BH condition were examples of non-goal directed actions, the
results are not surprising. However, contrary to our expectation,
goal attribution in the GH condition, an index of understanding
another person’s actions, did not predict children’s IC status.
These results suggest that goal attribution toward other people
and non-human agents may differentially influence children’s
creation of an IC.
In the literature on goal attribution, two distinctive systems
are involved in infants’ attributions of goal-directedness to an
agent (Johnson et al., 1998, 2001; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005;
Biro and Leslie, 2007). One system, a cue-based system, is an
innate modular system that identifies goal-directedness (Gergely
et al., 1995; Gergely and Csibra, 2003). The modular system
is sensitive to behavioral cues, such as self-propelledness (Luo
and Baillargeon, 2005), and therefore the system attributes
goal-directedness to any agents when infants detect such cues.
In contrast, the other system, an experience system, is one
that develops an understanding of goal-directedness through
experience (Meltzoff, 1995; Woodward, 1998). This system is
sensitive to human-like visual properties, such as faces, and
therefore the system may attribute goal-directedness to people.
Given the literature, it is possible that the former system may
be related to the creation of an IC. That is, infants who have a
modular system that is sensitive to goal-directedness are more
likely to attribute other psychological properties to non-human
agents, which may lead to the creation of an IC.
One might argue that the age at Time 1 varies, and such
variations may affect both the action prediction at Time 1 and the
IC status at Time 2. However, previous research has shown that
infants under 1 year of age showed goal attribution, and they tend
to attribute goal to other people as well as non-human objects
(Woodward, 1998; Luo and Baillargeon, 2005; Falck-Ytter et al.,
2006; Biro and Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Kanakogi and Itakura,
2011). In addition, our analyses controlled the effect of age at
Time 1. Nevertheless, we found that infants’ goal attributions
predicted their later IC status. The results suggest that the age
at Time 1 was not a significant factor that may mediate the
relationship between goal attribution and IC status. In addition,
one might say that the number of children with ICs was relatively
high compared to previous studies, and therefore the results in
this study may be invalid. However, in a previous study using the
same method, nearly half of the parents (N = 37) reported that
their children had an IC (Motoshima et al., 2014). The results in
this study were consistent with the previous results in terms of
that children were more likely to have personified objects than
invisible friends. Thus, even though the proportion of children
with IC was high, we believe that the results in this study were
valid.
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FIGURE 4 | An example trace plot of all iterations. This is an example trace plot.
FIGURE 5 | An example of every 50th iterations’ auto-correlation. This is an example auto-correlation.
TABLE 2 | Posterior means and 95% highest density intervals of standardized parameters.
GH path analyses BH path analyses MC path analyses
Posterior mean 95% Credibility interval Posterior mean 95% Credibility interval Posterior mean 95% Credibility interval
(Posterior SD) Lower upper (Posterior SD) Lower Upper (Posterior SD) Lower Upper
̂βX, Time 1 0.663 (0.123) 0.415 0.855 0.395 (0.182) 0.037 0.718 0.133 (0.211) −0.274 0.530
βTO.X −0.032 (0.260) −0.531 0.463 0.053 (0.273) −‘0.471 0.573 0.571 (0.201) 0.167 0.894
µX −2.273 (0.492) −3.115 −1.296 −1.740 (0.708) −2.954 −0.290 −1.383 (0.828) −2.926 0.221
τ1 −0.824 (0.321) −1.440 −0.179 −0.828 (0.322) −1.473 −0.207 −1.275 (0.316) −1.901 −0.643
τ2 0.813 (0.320) 0.194 1.442 0.801 (0.324) 0.171 1.435 0.295 (0.355) −0.362 1.010
σ2X 0.545 (0.147) 0.283 0.838 0.811 (0.131) 0.574 1.00 0.938 (0.073) 0.782 1.00
Lower, lower 2.5%; and Upper, upper 2.5%.
X in the left column is GH in GH path analysis, BH in BH path analysis, and MC in MC path analysis.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 221
Moriguchi et al. Goal Attribution and Imaginary Companion
The results may be consistent with the suggestion by Barrett
(2012) that the infants’ sensitivity to non-human objects may
be the basis for representing and interacting with an invisible
agent. On this theory, infants are equipped with skills to identify
and represent non-human objects as agents, and such skills may
make infants sensitive to the presence of possible agents around
them. Such sensitivity, along with the teleological tendency or the
concept of the creator, lead to a representation of a god (Barrett,
2012). Thus, in the present study, infants with such sensitivity
may be more likely to create non-human agents (ICs) than those
without the sensitivity.
Note we are not suggesting that the relationship between IC
status and mentalizing can be fully explained by the view that
the early mentalizing skills may lead to the creation of an IC.
A previous longitudinal study showed that IC status predicted
children’s mentalizing skills (Lillard and Kavanaugh, 2014). Thus,
we propose that the IC and the mentalizing skills are mutually
dependent. In other words, it is possible that early mentalizing
skills facilitate creation of an IC, which may further improve
children’s mentalizing skills.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the limitations of the present
study. First, the present study did not assess performance in
mentalizing tasks at preschool age. Such data would lead to a
better understanding of the relationship betweenmentalizing and
IC status. Second, although we conducted analyses with Bayesian
estimation, a bigger sample size is desirable. Third, we did not
collect data between Time 1 and Time 2, so developmental
progress during this period is unknown. Future research
should address the relationship between mentalizing and IC
status.
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